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BOOK REVIEWS
Bas van Fraassen. Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of
Perspective. 408 pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.∗
Curtis Forbes†
Readers of Bas van Fraassen’s previous work will find his newest book,
Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (2008), packed with
many familiar theses, albeit defended in interesting new ways. They will
also find many new themes and theses discussed in this book, outlined
with clarity and defended with philosophical insight. Those interested in
the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists, in particular, will
find this a more satisfying sequel to his first book, The Scientific Image
(1980), than any of his subsequent work.
To defend his anti-realist philosophy of science, van Fraassen invents
and employs several new terms, concepts, paradoxes, problems, and
distinctions; I have no doubt that their names will soon find a permanent
place in the common technical parlance of professional philosophers of
science. One such contribution is the development of two complementary
yet incompatible views of measurement and theory. The view “from
within” looks at measurement procedures in the historical process of
development, as they co-evolve with the theory that describes them.
Looking at measurement from within allows us to understand how abstract
pieces of mathematics (i.e., scientific models) gain empirical significance,
by becoming coordinated with concrete physical objects. In contrast,
the view “from above” looks at measurement procedures as they are
portrayed in an accepted scientific theory–as physical processes. Looking
at measurement from above allows us to understand measurements as
at once physical processes and representations. This, in turn, helps us
understand how, relative to a given theory, certain sorts of scientific
instruments can gather information about their target systems through the
right sorts of physical processes.
There is also an interesting anti-realist account of scientific experiments
as “engines of creation” given in this book, which contrasts with the realist
account of experiments as “windows into another world.” Whereas realists
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often portray scientific experiments as allowing us to discover things about
an unobservable world that was previously hidden from our eyes, van
Fraassen, inspired by some work by Nancy Cartwright (1999) and Ian
Hacking (1983), gives a equally adequate but metaphysically minimalistic
account of scientific experiments as simply creating new phenomena that
our scientific theories must then be held accountable to.
This anti-realist account of experiments will no doubt revitalize
the realism debate on its own, but for those interested in Scientific
Representation from a realist perspective, there is nothing more important
than van Fraassen’s new tripartite distinction between “appearances,”
“phenomena,” and “theory/reality.” The main anti-realist claim of this
book is drawn directly from The Scientific Image. Here, as before, van
Fraassen defends the claim that the aim of science is the production of
empirically adequate theories or models, where a model is empirically
adequate just when it accurately represents the observable phenomena.
Scientific realists, by contrast, claim that science aims for something more
than mere empirical adequacy, such as the accurate representation of
unobservable reality. It is by distinguishing appearances from phenomena,
as he previously did not do, that van Fraassen is able to clarify previous
ambiguities in his all-important notion of empirical adequacy. Many readers
will remember how fundamental this concept is in van Fraassen’s previous
work, and will be happy to see that it is outlined here in greater detail.
With a more precise notion of empirical adequacy in hand, van
Fraassen is able to specify his anti-realist philosophy of science in new
and elaborate ways, which is surely the main purpose of this book.
This specification is only possible once he has spent the bulk of the
book developing a variety of new conceptual tools for thinking about
representation, measurement, perspective, structure, and a variety of
other hot topics in the philosophy of science. Despite the important
connections that Scientific Representation has with his previous work,
the discussion of these new subjects could easily lead one to become
intellectually engrossed in this book without first reading any of van
Fraassen’s previous writing.
Having some new tools and terminology goes a long way for van
Fraassen, and after 250 pages of set-up, he does not disappoint his
main philosophical opponent, the metaphysical scientific realist, when he
presents an interesting new argument against scientific realism. What is
most reinvigorating about this new argument, and the rest of the book,
is that it promises to disturb the apparent stalemate that had developed
between van Fraassen and some scientific realists (e.g., Chakravartty
2007): here van Fraassen argues that the realist’s beliefs about the aim
of science are actually untenable, given the scientific adequacy of an
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empiricist version of quantum mechanics. Simply put, since quantum
mechanics is an acceptable scientific theory, realism is an unacceptable
philosophy of science. This is quite a challenge, one that scientific realists
will no doubt enjoy facing head on in the inevitable commentary that will
soon follow this book.
Van Fraassen has recanted some of his claims from The Scientific
Image, and deemphasized some of the themes found in his most
recent book, The Empirical Stance (2002), but this represents maturation
in his thought, rather than any substantial concession to his many
philosophical opponents. Many of his previous books, upon publication,
changed the tenor of the realism debate almost immediately, and
Scientific Representation will surely do the same. It is obviously of
interest to scientific realists who wish to engage in continued debate
with van Fraassen, but it will also prove interesting and useful to
philosophers of science working in other areas, especially those interested
in structuralism, perspectivism, measurement, and representation. I have
no doubt that, over the next thirty years, philosophers of science
will commonly be distinguishing “appearances” from “phenomena,” and
speaking “from above” and “from within”; many of them will probably be
treasuring well-worn copies of this book, as well. Scientific Representation:
Paradoxes of Perspective promises to be required reading for the next
generation of philosophers of science.
CURTIS FORBES
IHPST, University of Toronto
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